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Gianpaolo Baiocchi

Pariahs of the Wonderful City:
Crime, Representation, and the Imagined
Geography of Citizenship in Rio de
Janeiro, 1977-1982
Preventive police action, considered
sufficient for preventing robberies,
has no way of distinguishing between
criminals
and
citizens.
- Editorial criticizing police prejudice in randomly sea rching bus
passengers. Uornnl do Brasil 9 May
1982)1

Introduction

C 2002 d lsC/osure: o
journal of socio/ lheory
no. I I. Committee on
Social Theory. Unlver
slly of Kentucky.
Lexington. KY

142

Rio de Janeiro has always had an uneasy
relationship with its hinterlands. Ever since
freed slaves first built Jave/as with improvised materials atop Morro da Providencia hill
overlooking the city in the late nineteenth
century, it has never been clear what the relationship between the "Wonderful City," as
Rio de Janeiro is affectionately known, and
its surrounding slums ought to be. On the
one hand, eli tes and reformers have historically seen the sl ums as a place of moral degeneracy. Municipal leaders have initiated a
variety of "civilizing" projects aimed at
"bringing in" this periphery, and these have
ranged over the years from vaccination and
hygiene programs to fnveln urbanization programs, and more recently, to aggressive security campaigns. On the other hand, it is
from the slums that much of Rio de Janeiro's
allure originates: Sn111bn, Cnrnnvnl, soccer
players who learned to play in the streets,
the nwlntn. 2 In 1980, this metropolis of five
million had almost a million of its citizens
living in one of the 500 or so fnvelns scattered
throughout the urban landscape (Caval-

143

Baiocchi

Pariahs of the Wonderful City

lieri). By then, the term "urban hinterland" had become a metaphor for
the urban condition of the poor: while Jave/as were described in everyday speech as part of an "urban periphery" or "hinterland" that "surrounded" the city,favelas occupied all parts of the city, often rubbing up
against wealthy neighborhoods.
The symbolic struggle to define the city-faveln relationship and its
shifting geographical boundaries has always been bound up with fundamental questions of entitlement, power, and exclusion in Rio de
Janeiro. In this article, I examine public debates about urban problems
during the early years of the transition to democracy in Brazil {19771982) to illustrate the ways in which these debates constituted symbolic
contestations over the boundaries of inclusion into civil society. I argue
that the influx of migrants, growing fear of crime, and the uncertainties
of the political transition put the citizenship of the poor into doubt by
questioning their "proper place," their social entitlements, and their
civil rights. In Rio de Janeiro, dominant discourses of criminality and
poverty constructed a map of the city in a way that posed the impossibility of any eventual integration of slum-dwellers into the city proper,
and by extension, of endowing the poor with the rights and ent itlements of citizenship in Democratic Brazil.
On the eve of Brazil's full transition to democracy, discussions
about "fear of crime" and "urban poverty" in Rio de Janeiro served as
sites for the symbolic construction of the non-citizenship of the poor,
and helped legitimate their exclusion and violent repression in the new
democracy. The symbolic construction of non-citizenship in Rio de
Janeiro is evinced by three distinct but interrelated discourses. First,
geographical imagery presented the city as besieged. Public debates
continually posed the question of the place of the poor, and crime was
explained as the result of the poor being "out of place." Jnstead of a vision of the poor belonging to a specific place in the ci ty, this was a vision of the city invaded by an externa l threat. Second, crimina lity was
framed in terms of "demographic" as opposed to moral or medical discourses. Demographic explanations for crime differ from moral explanations in that they do not call for individual treatment or survei ll ance,
but rather expulsion, separation, and elimination . Finally, the appearance of a new type of criminal was posited, one whose reform was
deemed impossible and thus should not be subject to traditional disciplinary practices. As will be argued below, these discourses do not
align with disciplinary discourses ca lling for the survei llance, individuation, and reform of criminals and the poor (Foucault 1977).
Rather, they bear closer resemblances to discourses of "massive divisions" that characterize pre-disciplinary power regimes.
Tracing these discourses and their shift toward a non-disciplinary
regime in Rio de Janeiro during Brazil's democratic transition is the object of this essay. In order to do so, I analyze the discourses and signify-

ing practices through which a number of "official" voices have constructed dominant representations of the city and its inhabitants. 3 To
study the construction and contestation of citizenship and public problems requires the self-conscious study of official fora. Some of the most
cited "discussants" in this public cultural conversation were government and security officials, politicians, police chiefs (delegados), criminologists, and public defenders. For this research, then, I consider
citations, stories, editorials, and letters from both major newspapers in
Rio de Janeiro (0 G/obo, Jornal do Brasil), available transcriptions from
discussions in the legislature, and official reports. 4
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Citizenship and the Cultural Geography of Fear
Thinkers from Max Weber and Georg Simmel onward have pointed
to the historical importance of the urban bases of citizenship claims.
City-based m ntalitics make possibl the kind of civility implicit in citizenship, while the anonymity of urban ways of life requires citizenship
because of the need for impersonal standards to regulate interactions
among strangers. Herc I wish to make a case for a study of citizenship
thal is grounded in contested meanings of urban space. As urban social, political, and economic transforma tions call forth questions of citizcnshi p, answers to those questions bring about partial resolutions and
(rc)constructions of citizenship through discussions about the city and
its problems. The limits a nd content of citizenship, what it means, and
to whom it applies, are invariably implicated with the discourses and
signifying practices through which representations of urban space are
constructed. As new meanings emerge about urban space and about
what kinds of persons live and are allowed in it, citizenship is bounded
and reconstructed. Understanding the discursive shifts i11 these constructions becomes a crucial component of attempts to recover any
liberatory and democratic potential in citizenship itself.
I draw upon insights of both cultural geography and social theory
for tools to understand the contested nature of urban space and its implications for citizenship. Social theorists have in recent years reasserted the importance of space for a variety of social processes.
Following Lefevbre, de Certeau, Harvey, Soja (1989), and others, it has
become commonplace to maintain that space is constituted by and constitutive of social action. Influenced by cultural studies scholarship that
examines the importance of contestation over cultural forms and meanings, cultural geography has shown that meanings of space are always
subject to ongoing negotiation and contestation. In the late capitalist
metropolis, space has become particularly contested in light of the
transformations, instabilities, and upheavals associated with uneven
flows of capital, information, and people (Harvey; Castells 1996, 1997,
2000).s Because of these instabilities, and because n1eanings and representations of space arc always open to challenge and r -interpretation
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by transgressive or subversive practices, there is always "symbolic
work" that attempts to re-inscribe dominant meanings and representations in the face of these challenges (Cresswell 1996). Urban space is
therefore criss-crossed with dominant projects of class, race, gender,
and cultural hierarchies (Gregory).
Cultural geographers have examined the linkages between symbolic representations of space and relations of power and dominance
within a variety of contexts. 6 Of particular salience here are studies that
expose how representations of the city inscribe "geographies of exclusion" (Sibley), and how exclusionary geographies are organized
around dominant constructions of place (Cresswell 1996, 1997). Dominant discourses of criminality and deviance are important ways of ordering the social world by defining an "other" against which dominant
norms are measured and valorized. Likewise, dominant constructions
of a city's spaces as dangerous, deviant, or undesirable have b en established as one of the most important ways of culturally mapping the
city, both in official or mass media sources and in "everyday talk"
(Caldeira 2000). Defining city places as dangerous, threatening, dirty,
or disorderly constructs persons from those places as threatening, especially when they are deemed to be "out of place" (Cresswell 1996,
1997).
Sociologists and political theorists have also sought to interrogate
the geography of citizenship and its place-based meanings (Somers;
Brown). Chantal Mouffe, for example, suggests that we understand
"citizen" as not only a legal category but also a form of identity resulting from competition among conflicting discourses (Laclau and
Mouffe; Mouffe 1992, 1993). These discourses aim to fix the meaning of
citizenship, what groups of persons it extends to, and what aspects of
the common good ought to extend to them, resulting in structuring
what Mouffe calls political spaces- the political "inside" and "outside"
implicit in the construction of identities (1993, 69-71). The identity of
"citizen" is a construction that is neither ready-made nor necessarily
stable, but it is always organized around exclusionary oppositions to
its constitutive outside through the "determination of an other" (1992,
2). As discourses "fix" the boundaries of the political community, and
between citizens (bearers of rights) and non-citizens, the boundary between the two becomes disputed. As discourses that ex tend or shorten
the reach of citizenship are deployed, new justifications are given and
new "others" are constructed; the resu lt is that, particularly at times of
regime changes and realignments, there are intense contestations over
ambiguous and unstable "frontier effects" at the boundary of this political space as new configurations of citizenship call forth new outsiders (1992, 134).
As these" frontiers" were called into question in Rio de Janeiro du ring Brazil's democratic transition, new discourses were summoned to
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re-stabilize their boundaries. But what was unique to discussions about
the city and its problems at this time was that they underwent a shift
away from constructing social problems as individual problems and toward other sorts of explanations. While individual failings call for individualized interventions and surveillance- the kind of "panopticist"
disciplinary techniques Foucault describes as part of modem regimes
of power-demographic explanations that explain crime as a by-product of excess population call forth responses of division, separation,
and population control, and pose the impossibility of these "excess persons" enjoying the benefits of citizenship. Instead of descriptions of
slums as places of moral degeneracy, descriptions began to emphasize
the virus-like growth and multiplication of the poor. Similarly, representations of the city moved away from a gradated, disciplinary vision,
in which each class or group has a proper place, to a vision of the city as
"invad d." And inst ad of pointing to the importance of disciplinary
r form inside prisons, these discourses focused attention upon and
magnifi d th pr val nee of highly dangerous and irreformable criminals.
These discourses do not follow a "disciplinary logic" but rather a
"logic of inclusion/exclusion." As Foucault writes, these are opposing
logics characterized by the difference between the ideal of Benthamism
(disciplinary) and the ideal of the "city besieged by the plague" (nondisciplinary). According to Foucault, "rather than the massive, binary
division between one set of people and another, [Benthamism] called
for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization
in depth of surveillance and control" (1979, 198). While some scholars
have pointed to periods of co-existence between disciplinary and nondisciplinary discourses, this has genera lly been addressed in the context of colonial histori s.7 Little work exists that traces instances of
shifts, as J do here, away from disciplinary regimes. The fact that this
Lakes place during Brazil's transition to democracy is particularly significant, as it reveals contradictions in the democratization process itself. Att ntion to discourses about the city and its places brings
attention to fact that the transi tion to a formal democracy was part of a
process of the re-organization of citizenship that, in significant ways,
drew boundaries around the political community that were ultimately
more exclusionary, despite the demands of social movements.

Earlier Disciplinary Discourses
Early efforts to address urban problems in Rio de Janeiro, such as
the Pinna Agnc/1e urban plan of 1930, were already dealing with a landscape "polluted" by irregular housing (Stuckenbruck). By the 1950s,
public discussions about the slums wer describing in oppositional
terms the r lationship betwe n the hinterlands and the civilizing
project taken up by the city. 8 Reformist concerns in the 1950s and 1960s
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tended toward "moral" and medical explanations for poverty that emphasized individual pathology and prescribed integration, moral regeneration, and education as solutions. Social service efforts in Rio de
Janeiro, such as by the catholic charitable organization, Fundn9no Leno
XII, intervened into the social life, family life, and education of the poor
to prevent them from falling into criminal ways, and they were
strongly encouraged by the government until the 1960s (Pino). A typical government report from 1957 describes the Javela as "an area of disintegration, maladjustment, and disharmony easily set apart by its
seemingly chaotic and asymmetrical geometry," (30) but it also mentions that:
[the] Javelado is a hard worker of strong spirit, whose only fault is
scepticism. There is no definitive or marked sociological
characteristic to be attributed to the slum-dweller. (Goulart 31)

The report goes on to note that the slum-dweller has a noble savagery
about him: "women are not as likely to have abortions as some rich
ones" (32), the family of the Jave/ado is stronger (37), and the Jnvelndos
live in a racial harmony that is not present in many other places (35);
though the Javelado is a victim, "he is not irreligious" (38), and grea t social progress is promised by the intervention of the church. Similarly,
other social reports of the time emphasized paternalistic but reformist
solutions to the Javelados' social ills.
As Schwarcz documents, in the earlier part of the century eugenic
theories had gained currency in Brazil as a branch of medicine, partially as a result of the success of sanitation medicine campaigns
against cholera, yellow fever, and small pox. Elites were thus concerned with, among other "social problems" of the urban poor, the fate
of the country as a "mongrel" nation. The eugenicist Liga de l fygiene
Mental was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1922, and its prescriptions for
"improving the race" involved sanitation, exercise, and socia l services
for the urban poor. Similarly, there were paternalistic concerns with the
"degenerating" state of the family among urban poor and working
classes (Besse). The construction of the citizenship of the poor in Brazil
as a whole followed the same paternalistic logic. The urban poor were
considered wards of the tutor state and were entitled to limited social
benefits in exchange for the performance of "socially useful" labor, a
conception some have described as "regulated citizenship" (Santos).

The "City of 300 Slums" and the Transition to Democracy,
1977-1982
If we added all of the Javelados in Rio de Janei ro we would h ave the
third largest city in Brazil. -Marcos Candau, Secretary of Social
Development. Uornal do Brasil 13 Jan. 1980)

Viewpoints on urban problems decidedly shifted away from these
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paternalistic concerns toward non-disciplinary exclusion in Rio de
Janeiro and in Brazil in the late 1970s. National and city-based citizenship were particularly contested during this period immediately before
full transition to democracy in Brazil. Three factors called the limits of
citizenship into question: the rising number of urban migrants and urban poverty, the claims of new social movements, and the visible rise of
criminal practices in wealthy areas of cities.
Changes in agriculture had steadily forced millions of migrants to
urban centers since the mid-1960s, while land speculation and inflation
drove up the cost of rental housing, forcing many working poor into
shanty-towns (Singer; Kowarick 1980). These factors pushed the number of Jave/ados to almost three-quarters of a million out of the city's total population of five million by 1980 (Cavallieri). With Javela
settlements on the south side of downtown literally exhausting available physical s pac s, the "belt of poverty" now continued to extend
outward to the industrial northern region of the city. The resulting
landscape juxtaposed the Rocinha slum, housing as many as 200,000
persons, next to wealthy neighborhoods.
It was also during this period that the "popular pro-democracy
movement" began to organize and stage anti-dictatorship acts in many
urban ar as, including Rio de Janeiro. The military had ruled the country since 1964, and by the late 1970s the dictatorship had begun to show
signs that it might consider a transition to democracy, which it undertook in 1984. It was at this time, then, that numerous social movements
started to more visibly organize with expectations of the eventual transition. In Rio de Janeiro, activists organized a number of neighborhood
associations in poorer areas, as well as an umbrella organization of associations, FAMERJ, in 1979. Neighborhood associations grew from 33
in 1978 to 166 by 1981, making clai ms around issues of housing, security and public services (Boschi 1987). Progressive elements of the
Catholic ch urch became involved in pro-Jave/a issues and organized
base communities at the time as well. In the country as a whole, popular protest called into question the limits of citizenship by raising issues
such as the right to vote, the right to assemble, the right to unions, and
the cost of living, in a series of spectacular public acts. The well-known
strikes in the Sao Paulo industrial park in 1978 halted work for several
hu ndred thousand workers, as the cost of living movement drew thousands of people to protest. 9
A national debate about police efficiency, stricter punishments for
criminals, the death penalty, and safety in cities was also on going at
the time. Various scholars point to the scandalous headlines that appeared in major newspapers with regular frequency during the period
(Benevides; Cerqueira 1991). The ]or11al do Brnsil, one of the country's
most important newspapers, in augurated a "violence" section as well
as a regular "violence yesterday" feature on its front cover in 1981.
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Other newspapers also included stories and editorials about a "wave of
insecurity" gripping major urban centers. Scandalous "real crime
shows" on television and on the radio focused on life and events in the
slums, while journalistic books with titles s uch as "Rio: City of 300
Favelas" and "The Most Dangerous Place on Earth" hit the newstands
(Souza). In 1980, a group of lawyers and social scientists was commissioned to study the causes of urban crime, and the resulting report
(Brazil 1980b) marked, for some analysts, the beginning of an "official
panic" about crime (Cerqueira 1987).
Criminal practices had in fact increased in the period, and had
changed in spatial patterns (Coelho; Adorno 1993). Certain kinds of
criminal behaviors started to threaten the security of previously safe
wealthy areas, and violent crime increased in the a reas where it would
be likely to be reported as s uch. Whal is important abo ut this cha nge,
however, was how it was constructed, and how these constructions justified ever-more violent reactions to crime instead of ca lling for other
types of measures. So while homicides in Rio de Janeiro, for exa mple,
roughly doubled betweeen 1977 and 1981 (Coelho), a significant portion of this increase was due to increasingly repressive and violent police tactics, as "death squad" killings and police executions became
more frequent during the period (Americas Watch Committee). The
cityJs major crime syndicate was dubbed the Comando Ven11e/'10 (The
Red Command) by the media in an aJlusion lo communism. In April of
1981, it was the ostensible cause for the larges t singl e police operation
ever in Rio de Janeiro, a televised standoff between one of its leaders
and four hundred policemen (Lima 1994).

the city choked by these belts, with its poor circulating alarmingly
freely throughout it. The movement of the poor into certain areas of the
city posed the question of their "proper place," of where the poor ought
lo live and circulate, and of their place in society at large.
The answer ultimately given, that these persons had no place in the
city, implied that they were beyond the boundaries of the benefits of
citizenship. Earlier versions of urban planning and reform in Rio de
Janeiro entailed gradated forms of entitlements, whereas this version
only re-inscribed total non-entitlement. Murilo Maldonado, a Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (MOB) state deputy, expressed this discursive shift by sum moning some fantastic numbers about the invasion
of city streets by hordes of criminals and potential criminals (abandoned minors) against an ill-equipped police force. He inquired, "how
ca n yo u police well with a badly equipped and badly paid police in a
ci ty with mor than 150,000 aba ndoned minors and 30,000 condemned
criminals in lib rty?" (0 Globo 6May1979).
A typica l explanation for crime was that the poor were out of place
a nd in loo close proximity lo wealth. "Poor people out of place" were
bound lo feel a sense of frustra tion by virtue of being near the rich,
which can engender crime. Attila de Souza Leao Andrade jr., a Rio de
Janeiro lawyer, wrote in a n edi torial:

The Poor out of Place

Social science pundits were not loo far behind in "theorizing" the res ults of this contact. The 1980 report on criminality cited above blamed
not only the relative proximity of the rich and poor but also its virtual
analogue in the media, which allowed the poor to see the lifestyle of the
rich . Television was blamed for propagating "a consumerist culture
that exacerbates unlimited desire of always having more" (Brazil
1980b, 279), leading lo the "aggravation of pa tho logical factors, increasing the likelihood of crime" (294). Some authors of the study pointed to
"the visibility of relative social inequities in urban settings" (299) as a
more powerful determinant of crime than absolute poverty itself, and
worried abo ut the " the mental shock of the mother who leaves her hungry chi ldren in the fn vela to clean the kitchen of the elite family" (300).
Television and media influences were often cited as a cause of crime by
showing both impossibly wealthy lifestyles and "criminal ways" to
achieve them . Director of Metropolitan Police Heraldo Gomes explained:

Criminality does not stop growing and does not have geographi ca l
preferences. -Spokesperson of the Secretarial of Public Security
arguing against s pecial "treatment" to certain a reas. (Joma/ do Brasil
12 Mar. 1980)

All of these changes described above-the numbers of poor migrants, the transition to democracy and new social movements, and the
changing perceptions of crime-seemed to blur the city-Jave/a boundary. Concerns about this growing "other city," as a place of disorder
and lawlessness, as a source of crime and vice, a nd as a source of uncontrolled growth, dominated discussions of the topic in Brazil at the
time. The discourses summoned forth to deal with crime and poverty
during the period are telling, in that they represented a decided shift
from earlier discourses.
Rio de Janeiro in the Jate 1970s was characterized by its discursive
construction as besieged and surrounded on all sides by "belts of poverty" or "belts of insecurity." Against a vision of s pecific places in the
city for the poor, as in Haussman's plan for Paris, this was a vision of
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Bra/ilian Society has transformed itself in the last decades into one
of the most voracious materialist societies in history.... An ever
grea ter number of people begin to desire an ever greater number of
things in a world of sca rcity and ins ufficie ncy .... The result is the
advent of a sen timent of collective fru s tra tion that results in
violence. (}omni rlo Brnsil 22 Jan. 1980)

What occurs is the law of imitation, bccnusc man has the tendency
to imitate good acts and bad acts, and by watching "canned films"
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on television winds up copying the actions of bandits and acting
like them. Uornnl do Brasil 10 Oct. 1980)

At one point, Minister of Justice Ibrahim Abi-Ackel even suggested a
"gentleman's agreement" to television station owners to curb the
showing of films that "could induce violence" Uornal do Brasil 22 Jan.
1980).
These discourses proposed that the poor were out of place, and as
result of that "mis-placement", they began to imagine lifestyles they
should not aspire to. "Urban violence" in Brazil became, as Cerqueira
(1987) points out, a site to discuss concrete social conflicts at the time of
the transition to democracy. All of the ways to "solve crime" were intimately tied to dimensions of citizenship: as criminal acts represented
violations against the private property of the wealthy, they raised the
question of the social citizenship and entitlements of the poor. As General Reynaldo Mello de Almeida conceded," extensive policing is a palliative, not an action . The solution will be difficult to find, because the
economic problem will never be solved. In this place there will always
be rich and poor" (0 Globo 8 Jan. 1981).
These urban issues forced the question of the limits of citizenship:
what responsibility does the state have toward the poor? Are poor persons entitled to full civil rights? Exclusionary responses to such questions relied on notions of the poor being "out of place" and made
possible a transition to what Morse and Hardey have called a condition
of "permanent marginality," in which the number of poor in cities is
such that official concerns transformed from a search for solutions to
poverty to a search for methods of its containment. Another important
part of this shift was the departure from moral explana tions for crime.

Demographic Explanations
These geographical images, of a city besieged, of the poor out of
place, of belts of poverty, were intimately tied to "demographic" discourses of criminality, in contrast to a purely "moral" ones. Moral explanations for crime and the poor admit the possibility of reform, as the
individual criminal's conscience can be reached by intervention, while
purely "demographic" explanations deny s uch a possibility. A typical
statement of this demographic discourse is found in the National Development Plan, which explained "crime" in terms of "urban growth":
As a result of the negative reflexes of rapid urban growth on the
quality of life, most marked ly in the larger metropolitan areas, the
improvement of security services in these metropolises becomes of
eminent importance. (Brazil 1980a, 153)

Part of the problem seemed to be the uncontrollability and mobility of
the poor: internal migrations have "direct repercussions in certain
types of crime, making contraband trade easier, facilitating drug traf-
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ficking, and enabling the evasion of delinquents" (Brazil 1980a, 185).
Similarly, in the special report commissioned by the Justice Department, the causes of crime were explained as a product of "a generalized
neurosis that seems be a constant of Homo Urbanus of our times" (Brazil
1980b, 178). Crime, supposedly though a natural propensity of "man's
nature, of his society and of his culture" (185), was brought about by
the urban conditions that make crime more attractive to many. Another
report, the Regino Metropolitana do Grande Rio, echoed these themes, and
went so far as to point to the specific regions from which "criminals"
migrated:
A large part of the criminal youth who act in the state of Guanabara
.. . is from the areas of the Baixada Fluminense, Niteroi, Teres6polis.
... The increase in crimes reflects the problem of insecurity of
populations of rural origin, little adapted to urban standards.
Violence is therefore product of structural factors: the metropolitan
sys tem has the capaci ty to attract migrant populations, but not to
absorb it. (Brazil 1979, 213-4)

One implication of this kind of reasoning was that solutions depended
on "demographic control" of the poor rather than reformist or" civilizing" solutions. A city official contended that the favored solution to this
problem was forced family plannjng: "only those who can raise and
educate children should have them" Uornnl do Brasil, 12 Oct. 1980). ExMayor Marcos Tamayo agreed, arguing that "a lack of national family
planning will ... lead to a decline of already low levels of quality of
life" (]omni do Brasil, 12 Oct. 1980). The fact that demographic discourses were dominant had significant consequences for the construction of citi zenship of the poor. Instead of older-style "solutions" to the
socia l problems of the poor-such as the religious interventions and socia l work of the 1950s-the emphasis now became one of dealing with
excess population without regard for individual moral reform. In addition to this, crime came to be understood in significantly different
ways.

New Criminalities
If the poor were constructed as out of place in the city, and as be-

yond the intervention of traditional social services, a third type of discourse constructed the image of the changing nature of crime, such that
it represented a threat to the social order that must be elin'linated. The
"new crimina l" emerged from the slums, but he represented a new
type of threat; his motivations were not hunger or poverty, but rather
disruption of the social order. He was likened to a "communist subversive" who when incarcerated turned prisons into dens of vice. This new
type of criminality called forth extreme responses that applied to the
poor al large. The slum, by association, became a source of an alternate
order that threatened the order of the city. It was in the fnveln that chil-
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dren were initiated into the world of vice and crime, bul instead of representing an uncivilized world, as had been the case in the 1950s, lhis
now became a world deemed to be beyond normaliza lion and integration. This is directly relevant to dimensions of citizenship: the construction of a "new criminality" is the construction of a collective identity
that frustrates "normal" expectations of the poor and is therefore outside of the social contract. This in tum justifies policies and practices
that violate civil rights in order to protect the social fabric.
A debate in 1979 about prison reform, and a proposal to release
prisoners with good records to free up funds, was met with a lol of
public hostility. Attorney Paulo Torres argued against this reform on
the basis that many "irreformable" prisoners would be released, including some that would have thirty year sentences reduced to fifleen
due to good behavior:
This is a highly dangerous criminal who would never be reformed
in such little time, especially inside a penitentiary system wilhoul
occupation .... It would open the door to criminals, when iL would
be more important to increase the number of prisons. (}omni do
Brasil 25 May 1979)

The rise of new forms of organized crime suggested to many lhal a new
kind of response was called for. Criminologist Virgilio Donnici contended that "we have entered the acute phase of crime and from now
on it will only get worse. Today's criminals don'l act like lhe ones from
yesteryear, and are everyday more sophislicaled" Uornnl do Brnsil 10
Oct. 1980). Secretary of Justice Erasmo Martins Pedro concurred, arguing that as many as half of all prisoners were "highly dangerous" and
beyond reform, w hich for him meanl lhat "lhe federal governmenl
should build maximum security prisons in lhe inlerior or on islands"
Uornal do Brasil 27 Jan. 1980).
The "new criminality" was described as resembling the threal of
communism. One feature that distinguished this new lhreat from mere
"chicken thievery" (Ladrao de galinhas) was that crime was no longer
simply carried out by needy persons. A bank robbery in February of
1980, for instance, was noted because of the "unusual characteristics of
the criminals" who "were well dressed, did not commit violence, and
did not use foul language Uornal do Brasil 1 Feb. 1980). IL was concluded
that the new kind of criminaJity was motivated by the desire to disrupl
the social order. As Francisco Gama Lima, president of lhe private security firm Agents, noted in an interview, the new criminality is not motivated by hunger, but rather by the need for "getling revenge from
the system" Uornal do Brasil 27 Nov. 1980).
These discourses served to construct the image of a particularly
threatening internal enemy. An armed confrontation belween a famou s
criminal, Jose Jorge Saldanha, and members of lhe police escalated to a
standstill for severa l hours. The spectacular confrontation between the
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lone heavily armed criminal, trapped in the third floor of an apartment,
and as many as four hundred policemen, came on the heels of a "wave"
of bank robberies allributed to the Comando Ven11elho (Armorim; Lima
1994). As one of lhe partners of the besieged fugitive later reported:
The hunting season against us was open; we were completely
demonized. The words are not innocent: we were "commandos" ...
and if this wasn't enough, we were also "red," an adjective that
awakens old and mortal reflexes in the police and in the military.
(Lima 1991, 45)

A deputy in congress distinguished between old and new styles of
crime, and the ways in which the new style of crime violated tradiLional boundaries, unlike the kinds of crimes:
Which havl.? always happened since Cain and Abel, for various
motive<> including thl.? defense of honor and of life. [Today there is]
•.. ,1 terror that leads thousands of families not Lo leave their homes
al night, fearing the worst. (Discursos 110 Co11gresso Nncio11nl fl 5 Oct.
1980)

No longer confined to the city's slums, this form of criminality was
"oul of place." lls molives were different than simple need, criminals
were no longer reformable, and the responses to lhis sort of crime, as
wilh olhcr lhrca ls lo lhe social order such as communist infiltration,
needed lo be more swift and decisive.

Non-Citizens and Incomplete Panopticisms
Taken logelhcr, discourses that constructed the poor as invading
lhc city, thal offcred demographic explanations of criminality, ~nd ~hat
construcled lhc image of "a new criminality," had profound 1mphcalions for lhe cilizenship of the poor in lhe new democracy. Representalions of lhe poor as being "out of place" constructed their
non-ci tizenship by relegating them to areas beyond the reach of the
stale and by reinscribing their lack of social entitlement. Demographic
explanations for crime denied the possibility of reform and precluded
disciplinary s lrategies aimed at the poor. And discursive constructions
of the new criminal justified increasingly violent punishments and the
withholding of civil rights from the poor. Wh.ile changes in. ~he
country's polilical and economic landscape at the time of the transition
lo democracy implicitly and explicitly raised several questi~ns about
lhe limits of cilizenship, lhese discourses offered very exclus10nary answers. Preventative arrests were made lega l in 1980, and in 1981, legislation imposed preventative arrests for minors accused of crimes.
Extensive policing, and a greater presence of police forces in public
spaces, was also implemented in 1981. That same ye~ r, the f'.tnJ ~yste1~!
Refor111, which expcdiled punishment and ended the 1 e cess1ve nghts
of the accused, was enacled. ln terms of deaths al the hands of the state,
Brazil now has one of lhe highest death rates in the world, despite hav-
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ing no formal death penalty (Americas Watch Committee).
Economic changes or increased crime do not in themselves explain
calls for the reduction of civil rights or the expulsion of the poor from
city centers. These calls were the result of signifying practices which
functioned, as I have argued, as "cultural maps" of citizenship. This attention to cultural contestations over the meanings of the city's spaces
has led to a focus on the" frontier effects" of citizenship, that is, the limits of its entitlements. Cultural contestations over "frontier effects" are
intimately tied to meanings of place, and the "political inside and outside" that is the subject of these contestations becomes linked to discursive mappings of who belongs to what places. Just as Mouffe argues
that the political identity of "citizen" implies in its construction the
boundaries of a political space, it becomes possible to understand that
contestations over citizenship imply boundaries and meanings about
place.s, ai:d that, ~o.nvers~ly, debates over boundaries and places imply
certam kmds of citizenships. In this case, the symbolic practices J have
examined here served to "cut off" poor residents from full entillemenl
as citizens.
Certainly, Rio de Janeiro in 1980 does not stand alone as a city with
spaces constructed as "besieged" and invaded by dangerous elements
beyond the reach of disciplinary tactics. The symbolic construction of
European metropolises invaded by immigrants, or of North American
suburbs invaded by non-white urban criminals, not to mention the fear
of crime in many Latin American capitals, represent similar constructio~s. As authors who have taken up the concept of "moral panic" have
pomted out, such panics tend to arise in periods of economic crisis
(Cohen; Hall, et al.). Yet while the Jate 1970s was a period of downward
mobility of the middle class, and more importantly, of uncertainly
about the future, economic explanations are inadequate as downward
trends were present much earlier. A more complete explanation would
also have to include the uncertainties associated with the transition to
democracy and with the future of the city. In a sense, the transition
away fro~ .a dictatorship also meant a transition away from ordered
and safe cities and very fixed political horizons.10
A further component needs to be addressed, however. Although
geographers have taken up Foucault's (1986) scant writings on "heterotopia" or places of alternate ordering (Shields; Soja 1990), scholars have
only recently be?u.n to explore incomplete d isciplinary projects, and
the ways that this mcompleteness may make disciplinary projects unstable (Stewart). Disciplinary projects are never fully realized and
never occupy all space. Strategies of enumeration, such as censuses or
~f discipline, ~uc~ as prisons, have notoriously always been incomplete
m Brazil and 1n R10 de Janeiro (Chalhoub; Meade). "Proletarian Parks,"
for instance, were designed and built in Rio de Janeiro in the 1940s as a
strategy to discipline workers and included mandatory lectures over

loudspeakers about public morality. Only three such complexes were
ever built and they did not function for very long (Conniff 1981). Furthermore, penitentiaries were always underfunded, and human rights
activists began conducting a census of Rio de Janeiro's prisons in the
1990s due to the Jack of complete institutional records (America's
Watch Committee).
But panopticism has been incomplete in Brazil for another reason.
Elites have always had an uneasy relationship with the integration of
non-whites and the poor into Brazilian society. As students of the history of penitentiaries in Brazil have pointed out, even reformers were
skeptical of the possibility of fully reforming the lower rungs of Brazilian society because of attributed genetic and innate deficiencies
(Salvatore and Aguirre). The civilizing project always stood in opposition to the logic of innate deficiencies and simple exclusion, and the
logic of the prison always xisted in tension with the logic of expulsion.
The transi tion to democracy and the transformations of the city simply
foregrounded the question of citizenship for those groups whose integration into the ci ty and society were always provisional. When these
transforma tions raised the possibility of too many rights and of too
much mobility into and within the city, lines of exclusion, violent punishment, and non-citi zenship were re-drawn.
While socia l movements attempted to extend the boundaries of citizenship, " non-citizenship" was constructed through cultural re-mappings of the city that invalidated those rights. These discourses
constructed the poor as" not belonging" to any proper place in the city,
save those areas beyond the reach of the state, and justified repressive
solutions to social problems in the period of democracy. 11 While social
movements in lh late 1970s and 1980s sought to reclaim the city and
emphasize democratic access lo urban services, these exclusionary discourses made il easier for middle class residents to dismiss their claims.
On one hand, the non-citizenship of the urban poor and their "unworthiness" of rights made it difficult to construct claims that would be
broadly accepted. Several scholars have written about the privatization
and stark social separa tion that now characterize Brazilian cities, as
middle class residents continue to flee public spaces for ever more exclusive enclaves (Caldeira 2000). On the other hand, fnvelndos often
drew lines between themselves and "criminals," which also mitigated
against constructing collective claims (Zaluar 1983).
One of the implications of this retrenchment has been the way that
human rights reforms and activism have been discredited. The first
democratically elected governor of Rio de Janeiro, progressive Leonel
Brizola, attempted human rights reforms with the police, but faced a
severe backlash from the city's residents, who then voted him out of office for a candidate on a pro-order platform. In the years following the
events recounted here, human rights activis1n was being discredited as
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"privilege for bandits" even as numerous viola lions of the human
rights of fnveln residents were taking place (Ca ldeira 1991). A mass execution of residents of the Vigario Geral fnveln in 1993 by off-d uty pol ice
officers was followed in 1994 by army blitzkrieg atlacks and the occupation of the entire poorer northern side of Rio de Janeiro in a fantaslic
show of force. The mayor answered to protests from human rights
groups by proclaiming tha t it made no sense to demand human rights
in the Javelas now when no such rights had ever existed for residents of
the Jave/as (Estado de Sao Paulo 1Nov.1994).
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Notes
1. All translations from the Portuguese original were done by the author.
2. There are many interesting studies of the city-favela relationship. See Pino,
Chalhoub, Meade, Conniff, Gay, Boschi (1987), and Zaluar (1983).
3. Representations of the city arc regarded here as contested and competing
"cultural pr,1cticcs of sign ification rather than referential duplicates" of the
landscape itc;t•lf (Barne~ and Duncan 5).
4. Excluded from these were perspectives that might be used to reconstruct
" popular" discourses, s uch as popular AM radio programs (the nationally
syndicated Gil Gome!', for example) and popular songs or stories.

5. As I larvey puts it, in the capitalist city, " nobody quite knows what the right
time and place for everything might be" (239).
6. For example, see Gregory, Barnes and Duncan, Agnew, and Shields.
7. Sec, for instance, Rabinow, and Stoler. For Latin America, see Salvatore and
Aguirre. There is still little work that explores this theme in more contemporary periods.

8. See, for instance, the following reports: Geiger, Guanabara State (1969), and
Maltos. For a historical periodization of these earlier phases, see Pino (1996).
For a discussion of the Agnchc Plan, see Stuckenbruck.
9. On the development of the neighborhood movement in Rio de Janeiro, see
Boschi (1982, 1987). For a discussion of the strikes, the Worker's Party, and
social movements during the transition, see Kowarick (1994).
10. Chantal Mouffe, for instance, suggests we understand new authoritarian
projects in Eastern Europe as attempts to re-negotiate the insider/ outsider
boundary thal was losl with the fall of communism (1992, 4).
11. This is far from unique, however, when other transitions to democracy are
considered, particularly in their spatial dimensions. For a striking parallel in
South Africa, sec Christopher (2001).
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